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Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers
Nancy E. Dowd
Multiple parents, especially multiple fathers, are a social reality but not a
legal category.1 The assumption that every child has, or should have, two, but
* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of
Florida. This paper was first presented at the University of Oregon School of Law at a
conference organized by Professor Leslie Harris, "Protecting Children's Need for
Nurturance: Proven Strategies and New Ideas," April 24-25, 2006. Professor Harris
organized a lively and thought-provoking conference that ultimately led to this written
symposium. I am grateful for her leadership and the dialogue sparked by the
conference, including conversations with Melanie B. Jacobs, June Carbone, Marsha
Garrison and Professor Harris. I have also benefited from discussions with my
colleagues Lee Ford Tritt and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. I have been assisted in the
research of this article by Kristeen Witt.
' There are a number of indicators of these social realities. In 2001, "[f]ifteen
percent of children (10.6 million) lived in blended families. About half of these
children, 5.1 million, lived with at least one stepparent." ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON
FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Living Arrangements
of Children: 2001, at 2 (2005) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-
104.pdf. "Families with stepparents ... are an increasingly large component of two-
parent families"-9% in 1991, 10% in 1996, and 11% in 2001. Id. Stepparents
generally have no legal status unless they formally adopt their stepchildren, although
their income may be considered for some purposes, such as calculation of financial
status for educational loans or available resources for child support. June Carbone, The
Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L.
REV. 1295, 1311-14 (2005).
In addition, 3% of children lived in two-parent homes with their unmarried
mother and father, and 5.4 million children in 2001 lived with a biological parent who
was not married to their partner. KREIDER & FIELDS, supra note 1, at 2.
The Uniform Parentage Act attempts to establish a single legal father of a child,
but recognizes many potential categories of father including adoptive parents,
cohabiting partner of the natural mother, the natural mother's spouse, a man who lives
with the child and holds the child out as his natural child, or a man who has
acknowledged his paternity in writing. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 3-4, 9B U.L.A. 295
(amended 2002) ; see also R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three-or Four, or Five,
or Six: Redefining the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
231, 231-34 (2000); Note, Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and
Family, Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the Evolving
American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2052,
2052 (2003). A recent high-profile celebrity case of two men claiming fatherhood
involves the daughter of Anna Nicole Smith. See Former Boyfriend Files Lawsuit
Claiming Paternity of Anna Nicole Smith's Daughter, THE AMERICA'S INTELLIGENCE
WIRE, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-
18863758_itm.
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only two, parents remains a core operating assumption of family law.2 Yet at
the same time, our knowledge of the existence of multiple fathers, whether
birthfathers, stepfathers, psychological fathers or other categories, has found
some reflection in cases that have granted some relational rights to fathers who
do not fill the single place allotted for "legal father.",3 I propose in this article
that it is time to think not if, but how, to recognize multiple fathers within the
broader need to recognize multiple parents. The particular parenting patterns of
fathers provide a window into thinking through the ways multiple parenting
might work.4 While men's ability to nurture children is no different than
women's ability to nurture children, the general patterns of most fathers remain
quite distinctive from the general patterns of most mothers.5 This asymmetric
difference should not be ignored in devising rules and principles intended to
benefit children, even as we might differ over why this is so, whether it is
essential to change these patterns, or what change is desirable.
I would first propose a framework for consideration of the principle of
multiple parents: (1) the channelling function of family law, and (2) the
relationship between law and culture, particularly family law and culture.
Fifteen years ago Carl Schneider, wrote about the "channelling function" in
family law, the means by which "the law recruits, builds, shapes, sustains, and
promotes social institutions."6 Schneider did not say this is the only function of
family law. He identified five functions: protective; facilitative (law as a means
for people to "organize their lives"); arbitrative (law as a means to "resolve
disputes"); expressive (law as discourse, "imparting ideas through words and
symbols"); and channelling (law as creating or supporting valued social
2 Most famously, this was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Michael
H. vs. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), which noted that society's "traditions have
protected the marital family." Id. at. 125. It is the underlying assumption, also, of the
Uniform Parentage Act. See § 3-4, 9B U.L.A. 295 (amended 2002) ; see also Suzanne
Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based
Adjudiction, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1968-69 ("[T]he preference for mother-father
parental units [is] 'one of those unprovable assumptions."')
3 For legal standards used to recognize parents or allow visitation by individuals
other than the biological or adoptive parents of a child, see the following cases: Knott
v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975 (1995); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977);
T.B. v. L.R.M., 890 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 2005); A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999);
In re H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995). For a general discussion and
citation of more of these cases, see John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for
Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351, 363-67 & nn.105-
37(1998)..
4 See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text. For an extended discussion of the
patterns of fathers and an argument for defining fatherhood as nurture, see NANCY E.
DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000).
' See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
6 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495,496 (1992).
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institutions).7 The channelling function promotes societal values. In its
channelling function, law operates at the macro level rather than in an
individualistic, local, contextual way.8
Schneider identifies how channelling works in a variety of ways. First, the
state can "recogniz[e] and endors[e] institutions" (like civil marriage). 9
Second, the state can "reward [people for their] participation in an institution"
or status (again, marriage rewards).10 Third, competing institutions can be
disfavored (e.g., until recently, cohabitation without marriage)." Fourth,
people can be penalized or coerced for not using the institutions, although
Schneider finds it difficult to give examples of this.
12
Schneider also concedes that the channelling function of law has its down
sides. Other alternatives may be badly treated, for one.13 Or, channelling may
only be mildly successful, because it is so rarely coercive. 14 But he argues that
channelling nevertheless is important, because it often reflects and facilitates
cultural norms, even if those norms are in transition. The two examples he uses
to illustrate the channelling function of family law are marriage and
parenthood. 15
Schneider argues that more commonly law supports, rather than creates,
social institutions that reflect core values or principles. I would agree. As I
have previously argued, I believe law more often reflects and follows culture
than vice versa. 16 Particularly in family law, it seems that more often culture is
far ahead of, and ultimately changes, law. Law rarely, or with great difficulty,
changes culture, although legislators continue to try to make law serve this
role. 17
7Id. at 497-98.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has recently detailed a comprehensive view of the
functioning of children and families from the macro to the micro level, explicitly
combining her generist approach with environmental perspectives, creating an
ecogenerist model. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Cleaning Up Toxic Violence. An
EcoGenerist Paradigm, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE AND VIOLENCE 415-
33, (Nancy E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the
Debate about the Socialization of Children. An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 85.
9 Schneider, supra note 6, at 503.
10 Id.
"1 Id.
12 Id. at 504.
13 Id. at 505-06, 519-20. Alternative institutions are disadvantaged by imposing
criminal sanctions, or by withholding the state's approval for the institution.
14/d. at 519.
15 Id. at 502-05.
16 Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture and Family: The Transformative Power of
Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 785, 786 (2002).
'7 Id. at 791. For example, movement in family law to a gender-neutral idea of
parenthood has not changed the gender-skewed custody and care patterns of children.
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Law is part of cultural discourse, either as a hindrance to social change or
as affirmative support for change. As is particularly evident in family law, law
is not neutral. 18 I have argued that where the law acts in a way that resolves
cultural conflict, two principles should be used: the antisubordination principle
and the limited instrumentalism principle.19
Under the antisubordination principle, law should adopt rules that do not
subordinate individuals or families.20 If law's power is exercised, as discourse,
rights, or coercion, we should ask who benefits from that power and what
results occur.
Under the limited instrumentalism principle, in recognition of the limited
role of law in social and cultural change, we should ask whether we are trying
to impose a rule that is ahead of cultural values.2' Or, put differently, we
should not ask law to accomplish social change that society is unwilling to
support. "Mere legal rules, without affirmative and meaningful support, can be
undermined by power, culture, or both. 22
In summary, when considering whether to embrace, and how to embrace,
the notion of multiple parents, and in particular, multiple fathers, it is helpful to
consider (1) the channelling function of family law, and (2) how law and
culture intersect. We should evaluate any proposed resolution against the
antisubordination principle (that is, whether the adoption of multiple-
parenthood reflects subordination or liberation) as well as the limited
instrumentalism principle (are we trying to accomplish social change that does
not have cultural support, or support social change that the culture already
embraces).
What I explore in this article is how multiple-parenthood, and particularly
multiple-fatherhood, might work. I have mote questions than answers because
once you get beyond the initial principle, the devil is in the details. I also hope
that thinking about this from the perspective of the channelling function of
family law, as well as the relationship between law and culture, is helpful to
finding the answers about how the principle of multiple-parenthood, and
specifically multiple-fatherhood, might work. I conclude that the general
principle of multiple-fatherhood is supported by the channelling function of
18 Id. at 785. Two of the most notable recent examples of this are Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), both of
which evaluated statutes that take a clear position on family matters. In Troxel, the
Court evaluated a broad third-party visitation statute, and a plurality held that as-
applied, the statute violated fundamental parental rights strongly supported under
constitutional substantive due process doctrine.. See 530 U.S. at 72 (plurality opinion).
In Lawrence, the Court considered a state statute criminalizing sodomy and held it
violated personal guaranties of personal liberty in adult intimate relationships. 539
U.S. at 578.
19 Dowd, supra note 16, at 787.20 id.
21 ld.
22 Id.
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family law, as well as the law's role to support affirmative cultural change. It
does not offend the antisubordination principle nor does it conflict with the
limited instrumentalism principle. In essence, we already practice multiple-
fatherhood, for the benefit of children, but multiple-fatherhood is not always as
strongly supported as it might be to further children's positive outcomes. The
far more difficult issue is how to implement multiple-fatherhood. In Part I of
this article I look at the context of fatherhood. In Part II, I suggest the range of
possible models of multiple-fatherhood, and advocate a model of shared but
unequal coparenting with a core father. In Part III, I consider some issues
regarding implementation of this model. I conclude by returning to the law's
channelling function and measuring the law's role in relation to culture.
I. THE PRACTICE OF FATHERHOOD: PATTERNS AND CONTEXT
A. Fatherhood as Nurturing
The core principle of parenting, in my view, is nurture. Thus in my prior
writing on fathers, I have argued that the legal system should move from a
definition of fatherhood based on genetics, marriage, or economic support to a
definition centered on care.23 I have advocated defining fatherhood as nurture.
Nurture should include not only the practice of caring for children, but also the
24practice of cooperation with other caregivers. It has both qualitative and
quantitative components. "Social fatherhood is the practice of nurture, either
alone or in combination with other caretakers, as the sole or primary parent, or
contributing as closely as possible to an equal amount of caregiving in
partnership with the other primary parent or parents. It is non-exclusive,
cooperative parenting. 2 5 Nurture should be defined in a very rich way,
including the psychological, physical, intellectual, and spiritual care of
children. It should be developmentally related, and therefore fluid, not fixed, to
fit the particular child's needs as well as their developmental stage.
Qualitatively, it includes both children's well being and the well being of other
caretakers, and therefore is interconnected with other household work, and the
balance of wage work and family work. Quantitatively, I have defined this as
shared responsibility, as close to fifty-fifty as possible, but no less than sixty-
forty (or proportionate to the presence of other caregivers).26 Implicit in my
norm of nurture is commitment to the child that is sustained throughout the
child's lifetime.
23 DOWD, supra note 4, at 213. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child Centered Perspective on Children's Rights, 14 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1747 (1993) (advocating a generist definition of parentage grounded in nurture).
24 DOWD, supra note 4, at 177-78.
25 Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and
Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1312 (2005).
26 DOWD, supra note 4, at 175-76, 218.
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As part of this definition of fatherhood, I have advocated that we adopt a
principle that a child may have multiple parents, not simply two.27 I have done
so based on the life patterns and care patterns of fathers. Unlike the dominantly
linear care patterns of mothers, who parent their children throughout their
childhood, fathers frequently engage in serial parenting linked to the
households that they share with partners, which is tied to patterns of greater
non-marital childbearing and divorce, as well as the continued dominance of
women as the primary caregivers of children.28 Fathers therefore nurture
children as they live with them, and sometimes they engage in parenting
children located in more than one household at the same time.29 Children may
have a father as a constant nurturing presence, but a significant number of
children may experience a series of fathers or several fathers at the same
time.30 Yet another portion of children have no nurturing father at all.31
Because of men's nurturing patterns, and children's experience of men's
nurture, recognizing multiple-parenthood makes sense, for men and children.
More recently, I have been asked to answer the question of how parentage
should be determined at birth.32 The legal designation of "parent" might seem
most logically at birth to fit a child's genetic parents (leaving aside for the
moment the permutations possible through the use of reproductive
technologies).33 However, the legal choices also include designation of
fatherhood by marriage (the mother's marital partner at birth is the father),34 or
designation of fatherhood by conduct (identifying the social father(s)). 35 I
would argue even at birth legal designation of fatherhood should be governed
by nurture and include the principle of multiple-parenthood.36
Clearly at birth, sometimes the genetic and social father is the same
person, and he is married to the mother. But just as clearly, the genetic father
and the social father might not be the same person, and there may be a third,
marital father. I have argued that nurture should define parentage and that we
should look to the father's actions during the pregnancy and at childbirth to
designate parentage at birth.37 I am willing to presume that a genetic father is a
271d. at 219.
281d. at 19-47.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. Fatherlessness in terms of the lack of an identified biological or marital or
adoptive father has been the primary focus of social policy geared at insuring income
support. The fatherlessness that I focus on here is the lack of a social father.
32 See Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909 (2006).
" Id. at 909.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 913.
36 Id.
371 d. at 917-22.
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social father, subject to rebuttal.3 8 To that extent I am willing to give genetics
an edge or recognition at the moment of birth, if it is essential to determine or
designate parentage at that moment. At the same time, a purely social father
should be recognized if he demonstrates nurture of the child. If there are two
social fathers, both would be recognized; if there was a genetic and social
father, genes would not trump care. 39 Rather, allowing for multiple fathers
obviates the necessity to choose one person to take the single legal place
available.
The factors that would establish a social father at birth would include the
actions of the father during the pregnancy, his presence at the birth, and his
intention to care for the child, reflected in his acknowledgment of paternity and
the consent of the mother. 40 Subsequent to the birth, it is possible that a child
would have additional social fathers, for example one or more stepfathers.4 1
A genetic father should have an economic duty of support,42 but only a
social father should claim the full rights of fatherhood, based on a record and
ongoing performance of care/nurture. Therefore fatherhood would not be a
single, unitary status with complementary rights and responsibilities, but rather
could include multiple adults who may or may not have equal status.4 3 In this
article I move away from a focus at the moment of birth, and explore more
fully how multiple fathers might be defined over the life course of the child.
Multiple-parenthood, in theory, seems simple and easy to define. The
underlying principle is not difficult to articulate: "More is better," when the
more is nurturing parents and nurture includes positive relationships with
children and other caretakers. Or, the principle might be stated as "love the one
you're with"-multiple-parenthood might recognize the patterns of successive
parenting and support the parent who is there, doing the work of nurture. We
might be concerned, however, to ensure consistency and reliability for
children, rather than imagining parenthood as something one could accept and
then pass off to another. In addition, if there are multiple parents, we might
worry about the relationships among them. So as with most things in family
law, a singular principle rarely works; it is always modified by "it depends."
That challenge can best be seen by looking at fathers and children, their lived
patterns of nurture, and identifying the questions raised by this context.
38 Id. at 922-27.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 This economic duty is grounded in responsibility for bringing a child into the
world, and the child's inevitable dependency.
43 Dowd, supra note 32, at 927-28.
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B. The Context of Fatherhood: Patterns of Care
It is important to think of multiple-fatherhood not in the abstract, but
rather in the context of how fatherhood, in general terms, is practiced. 44 Most
men become fathers, in the genetic sense, but a significant number of fathers
do not engage in nurture as I have defined it. The types of fathers could be
described as (1) those who nurture parallel to the typical pattern of mothers; (2)
those who nurture as a backup to a primary nurturer, thus playing a secondary
nurturing role; (3) those who engage in very little nurture but who are present
in the household and support the family economically; (4) those who are
predominantly economic fathers and do not share the household; and (5)
disconnected fathers who do not have a social or economic relationship to their
children.45 The proportion of men who parent akin to mothers, as primary or
sole nurturers, or as co-equal parents, is quite small, although the numbers
have increased substantially.46 Far more common is the practice of secondary
parenthood to mothers as primary caregivers. What is disturbing about the data
about fathers, however, is the extent of disengagement of genetic fathers from
their children.47
44 Multiple-parenthood can include a variety of scenarios, but it is helpful for me
to think about how it functions in the context of the parenting patterns of fathers. There
are others who might view it in terms of same sex couples, stepparents of either
gender, cohabitants, or other relatives like grandparents, aunts and uncles, or other
extended family.
45 DOWD, supra note 4, at 81-83.
46 Id. Of 18.5 million children that lived with a single unmarried parent in 2001,
only 2.2 million lived with their fathers; 4 million children lived with their biological
mother and a stepfather compared to 815,000 that lived with their biological father and
a stepmother. KREIDER & FIELDS, supra note 1, at 2.
47 DOWD, supra note 4, at 83. The percentage of children under the age of
eighteen living with two married parents decreased from 85% to 68% from 1970 to
1996. CHILDTRENDS DATABANK, FAMILY STRUCTURE,
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/ 59familystructure.cfm. The percentage
of children living in mother-only families has increased from 11% in 1970, to 24% in
1997 and 23% in 2005. Id. In 2005, only 35% of black children lived with both
parents. Id. In a study of children bom in 2001, by nine months of age, one in five
children lived in a household without a father. KRISTIN DENTON FLANAGAN & JERRY
WEST, CHILDREN BORN IN 2001: FIRST RESULTS FROM THE BASE YEAR OF THE EARLY
CHILDHOOD LONGITUDINAL STUDY, BIRTH COHORT (ECLS-B) 32 (2004), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005036.pdf. Of these children, only 40% had contact
with their father on the day of the study interview. Id. Thirteen percent of the children
had never seen their father. Id. After divorce, involvement of noncustodial fathers
typically declines over time. TERRY ARENDELL, CO-PARENTING: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE, NATIONAL CENTER ON FATHERS AND FAMILIES 16 (1996), available at
http://www.ncoff.gse.upenn.edu/litrev/co-litrev.pdf Only 25% of children see their
noncustodial father at least weekly. Id.
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A second significant pattern in men's fathering is the degree to which men
parent serially based on the person with whom they share their household. 48 In
other words, if men do not remain married or cohabiting with the mother of
their children, the lack of household connection is reflected in a pattern of
diminishing nurture of children. When they remarry or cohabit with another
partner, however, men will commonly nurture the children in the new
household (whether stepchildren or genetic children).49 It is possible then,
given marriage and divorce rates, that men may father several groups of
children, as a genetic parent, marital parent or purely as a social parent, but
their tendency is to do so serially, rather than multiply nurture all children with
whom they have a connection. 50 Thus, for example, a man who marries,
divorces, and remarries might diminish his connection to the children of his
first marriage, maintain a strong relationship with the children born during his
second marriage, and might socially coparent stepchildren in the household of
the second marriage. Less common is the pattern of a man socially coparenting
all children that he has fathered, whether they are in his household or not.51
Some of these patterns are not solely the consequence of choice. They are
strongly affected by men's relationships to women, who often are gatekeepers
to men's relationships with their children, and they are also affected by the
degree to which the workplace supports fatherhood and the courts support
engaged social fatherhood.52
The serial parenting pattern of many fathers contrasts significantly with
the linear parenting pattern of mothers, although mothers as well may have
more tenuous connections with children not in, or no longer in, their
household, such as stepchildren.53 The asymmetry of mothers and fathers is a
stark reality that translates into social assumptions about the differential
abilities of fathers as compared to mothers. In fact men can and do parent as
well as women do, but we either assume incompetence or lavishly praise
54ordinary care.
48 DOWD, supra note 4, at 82-84.
49 Id. at 64-65. Most stepfathers "perceive themselves as having a positive
fatherlike role-identity." William Marsiglio, Stepfathers With Minor Children Living at
Home: Parenting Perceptions on Relationship Quality, 13 J. FAM. ISSUES 195, 204
(1992).
50 DOWD, supra note 4, at 65.
51 Id. at 63-65.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 26-31. On mothering patterns and practices generally, see: MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004);
and Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992).
54 On the challenges of fathers related to stereotypes, see Martin Malin, Fathers
and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1089 (1994) which explains how gender
stereotypes often discourage men from taking advantage of parental leave. See also
Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 759
2007]
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Fathers matter to children because nurture matters. They also matter
because father presence correlates to greater economic resources, in general,
and that has an enormous impact on children.5 ' The presence of fathers also
confers psychological and intellectual benefits as well that link particularly to
the presence of additional nurturing adults, not some essentialist genetic
uniqueness linked to men.56 Because men link so strongly to economic
resources that impact outcomes for children, there are significant differences
by class and race among fathers, since economic opportunity is affected by
those two factors.57
Class and race also affect the way men father. Class, for instance, makes it
far more likely that men will co-equally nurture when they are blue collar
workers.58 Dividing care by split shifts is the classic example of this. Race
impacts fatherhood because different traditions of masculinity impact on the
ideal image or role of father.59 Men of color, for example, face a greater
challenge successfully helping their children, and particularly their boys,
develop and grow within a racist society, while at the same time benefiting
from cultural norms of community care.6°
Contemporary patterns of fatherhood in the U.S. are sharply divergent
from an ideal that each child have a father, much less more than one. But those
patterns also suggest that we fail to recognize all nurture that men provide.
What better way to encourage more nurture than to value it where and when it
occurs, while simultaneously advocating that fatherhood imposes a lifetime
fiduciary relationship. Serial fatherhood benefits children as compared to
fatherlessness or father presence without nurture. But serial fatherhood should
be viewed as distinctly secondary to a preferred model of fatherhood as a
lifetime commitment.
I have suggested previously that the current context suggests a range of
questions, if our goal is to increase the nurture of children while also
increasing social fathering for men's own sake. 61 (1) Do we work with the
(2000) (discussing how gender norms play a role in determining who takes leave under
the current Family Medical Leave Act).
55 DOWD, supra note 4, at 84.
56 Id. at 85.
" Id. at 84.
58 Id. Parents with less income and less education are more likely to work
alternating schedules to care for children. "Co-parenting... appears to occur
predominantly in middle and middle-upper class families." ARENDELL, supra note 47,
at 16; see also HEATHER BOUSHEY, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH,
TAG-TEAM PARENTING USED BY LOWER-INCOME, LESS-EDUCATED WORKERS passim
(August 2006) (discussing how primarily low-income parents "work alternating
schedules so that each parent can be home to care for the children while the other
parent is at work"), http://www.cepr.net/documents/workschedules-2006-08.pdf.
59 DOWD, supra note 4, at 65-74.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 157-62.
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patterns that we have or try to change them? (2) Should fatherhood be
supported exclusively or preferentially within marriage? (3) How do we
empower fathers without subjugating mothers? (4) Do we envision fatherhood
as a single-parent or dual-parent role? (5) Can we support nurturing fatherhood
while insisting on financial responsibility? Will we continue to see financial
responsibility in individual, and unequal, terms? And (6) how do we
incorporate the fluidity and multiplicity of family structures and changes over
time?
Briefly, my answers to these questions are grounded in the importance of
nurture.62 We should work with the patterns that we have but not accept the
idea that fatherhood is about genes or dollars. Nurture should be strongly
supported, but rights should attach only when nurture approaches the
qualitative and quantitative measures that signify a complete embrace of the
fiduciary responsibilities of parents to children. Non-marital cohabitation is so
pervasive 63 that privileging marital fatherhood makes no sense for children.
Ensuring that supporting fathers does not derogate mothers requires that we
always "ask the other question," such as how will this affect mothers when
rules or structures are put in place to help fathers? I have argued that fathers
should be coequals, not secondary parents, or the meaning of nurture is
unacceptably diluted. We can demand economic responsibility of those who
have the ability to pay and support their children, but it is clear we cannot
expect that to pull most poor children out of poverty. 6 4 Finally, we can account
for changes in family structure by focusing on function rather than form.
Multiple fathers answers the question of whether we should support more than
one father for each child, but the presence of multiple fathers has an impact on
these other questions as well.
62 See id. at 179-80. For a more general and thorough discussion on the
importance of nurture, see id. at 157-231..
63 In 2003, 4.2% of households classified themselves as unmarried partner
households compared to 2.9% in 1996. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 16 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf). Forty-one percent of these
households had children under the age of 18. Id. at 17.
64 See ELAINE SORENSEN & CHAVA ZIBMAN, CHILD SUPPORT OFFERS SOME
PROTECTION AGAINST POVERTY. NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, SERIES B, No. B-10, at 2 (March 2000) ("Child support lifts about
half a million children out of poverty ."), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/blO.pdf. Seventy percent of poor children with a
non-resident parent do not receive child support. Id. at 4. These children's non-resident
parents tend to be those for whom child support payments would be a particular
hardship. Id.
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C. Implications of the Social Context for Defining Multiple Fathers
As our social context indicates, many children have no father. Thus, the
problem is not multiple fathers, but none at all. Many children's biological
fathers are unidentified and/or they have no social fathers whatsoever.
Increasingly, paternity establishment rates are rising so that we can anticipate
that a biological father could be identified for all or most children.65
Establishment of paternity does not, however, ensure either economic support
or social fatherhood. Certainly our goal should be that children have both:
adequate economic support and nurturing. 66
In other contexts of fatherhood, however, a child might have more than
one social father, either at the same time, or seriatim. If the fathers can work
collaboratively with other caregivers, mothers or fathers, then it makes sense to
support the notion of multiple fathers. In some scenarios, there may be a
biological father, or a father deemed the legal father by paternity law, as well
as a social father. In other words, the multiple fathers may not all be social
fathers. Multiple-fatherhood should obviate the scenario where a legal father,
the sole father, is not a social father to a child, and the social father has no legal
standing. This kind of scenario sometimes becomes evident only in tragedy; in
the aftermath of September 11 th, some children ended up with legal parents
who were not their social parents, while their social parents had no legal
standing.67 At the same time, there were children who grieved for their social
parents but who were not legally recognized as their "children.
' 68
Multiple-fatherhood might have several meanings, especially given the
context of fatherhood as currently lived and practiced. The variations could
include: (1) multiple nurturers, simultaneously parenting; (2) multiple
successive nurturers, parenting seriatum; or (3) multiple fathers, not all of
whom are nurturers, or not all of whom nurture equivalently. In this last
variation, some of the fathers (genetic, marital, or a non-marital partner of the
mother) are not social fathers, but have either rights or obligations or may
simply be present in the household due to their relationship with the mother.
Finally, among social fathers, there might be coequal or unequal nurturers.
Consistent with my core principle of parenting that nurture is the key
organizing principle of parenthood, multiple-parenthood must work on a
functional basis.69 If fatherhood is described in this way, and given the
65 See Dowd, supra note 32, at 923.
66 At the same time, it is important to emphasize that it is not essential that every
child have a nurturing father, nor that all children have two parents. For an extended
argument in support of the value of single parent families, on the basis that it is
function, not form, that defines good families, see NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF
SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES (1997).
67 Dowd, supra note 16, at 113-20.
68 Id.
69 On functional parenting, see: Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In
and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269, 270 (1991); Leslie Joan Harris,
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variations of how multiple-fatherhood might play out, combined with the
context that I have described, I believe this raises a series of questions for
defining multiple-fatherhood. First, should this be a legally recognized status
beyond what is available now, or is it better to leave things to informal
arrangements? Could legal intervention create more harm than good, and does
intervention upset the current balance of power? Second, do we imagine
multiple parents as coequals or as one primary parent with one or more
secondary parents? Third, how would financial responsibilities be distributed
among multiple parents? Fourth, would multiple-parenthood undermine the
support of nurturing fatherhood-is exclusivity needed? Finally, what existing
models do we have to draw upon, and what further research would be
desirable? I address these questions in the next two sections.
III. MODELS FOR MULTIPLE-FATHERHOOD
A. Benefits of a Two-Parent Model
We already have multiple fathers. What we do not have is legal
recognition of those parents or legal protection of children's relationships with
those caring adults if the adults fall outside of the two legal parents that
children are generally permitted to have.70 But the first question that we must
ask is whether the existing structure has benefits. Could legal intervention
create more harm than good, and does it upset a balance of power which in
most or many circumstances is a good one?
The benefit of a more limited set of parents has to be considered from
both the perspective of the primary caretaker, usually the mother, and the child.
Retaining the existing limit of two parents, coupled with implicit or explicit
recognition of primary caretakers, would give deference to the primary
caretaker and allow her to control the scope and number of relationships with
the child.71 As a non-parent, other adults would have to meet a more stringent
standard to have their relationship legally protected, and the scope of the
relationship might be more limited. The model here would be something like
72grandparent visitation or third party visitation statutes.
Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461 (1997),
480-83; Melanie Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal
Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 435-36 (2005); Note, Looking for a
Family Resemblance: the Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of
Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1646-47 (1991).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
71 Martha Fineman has argued for reorienting family law around the mother-child
dyad in recognition of the model of care typical of most children. See generally
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
72 On grandparent and third-party visitation statutes post-Troxel, see: James G.
Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children 's Existing Rights in State Decision Making About
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Fiona Kelly has explored this issue particularly in the context of lesbian
families.7 3 She identifies as a primary problem with multiple-parenthood the
fear that a court would try to insert a father under the guise of expanding the
primary parents, but really to include a man in the family.74 Her concern is that
two parents would not be viewed as enough when the two do not conform to
heterosexual norms; multiple-parenthood would then be used in a perverse
way, providing an indirect justification to correct perceived gender
imbalance.7 5 This feeds into assumptions about the necessity of the presence
not only of two parents, but of a parent of each gender. Her analysis suggests a
similar dynamic might operate when the family is a single parent family. The
nuclear family norm of two legal parents then becomes a way to protect
nontraditional families from state intrusion, just as norms of parental autonomy
served the single parent mother in Troxel in resisting the demands for visitation
of the grandparents.
7 6
A similar debate continues over how to deal with cohabiting couples,
complicated of course by the debate over same-sex marriage.77 The
Their Relationship, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 845 (2003); Sally Goldfarb,
Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where should States Draw the
Line? 32 RUTGERS L.J. 783 (2001); cf Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court
Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts' Reluctance to Declare
Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14 (2003)
(arguing that states should craft definite and specific rules for visitation with caring
adults while maintaining the presumption in favor of parent's rights); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse & Sacha Coupet, Troxel v. Granville: Implications for At risk Children
and the Amicus Curiae Role of University-Based Interdisciplinary Centers for
Children, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 857 (2001) (arguing that scholars must ensure a child
centered debate that includes the voices of children in all circumstances)
73 See Fiona Kelly, Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and
Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 133
(2004).74 Id. at 140.
15 Id. at 172.
76 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Nancy E. Dowd, 2001
Annual Survey of Family Law: United States, 16 INT'L J.OF L. SOC'Y & THE FAM. 439
(2002) (focusing on Troxel and arguing it both supports and stigmatizes single-parent
families); Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents after Troxel v. Gransville:
Where Should States Draw the Line? 32 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 817 (2001) ("If state law
defers to the choices of married couples about who can spend time with their children,
it should accord the same deference to the choices of single parents and parents living
with new partners."); David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing
American Family, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 718 (2001) (discussing how the court
analyzed rights based on the role the adults play in the children's lives, and not simply
on biology); Roberts, supra note 72, at 26 (discussing how Troxel affirmed the
presumption that parents' decisions reflect the best interest of the child);.
77 For a sampling of the debate on cohabitation, see: Margaret F. Brinig & Steven
L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation be the Legal Default Option?, 64 LA. L.
REV. 403 (2004); Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the
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cohabitation debate ranges from the imposition of responsibilities and rights,
especially if there are children, 78 versus arguments that no legal obligations or
rights should be recognized beyond those that the parties contract to create, or
which are already created by law, such as child-support obligations. 79 Some
would argue that parties should count on the law not to impose any legal
obligations, leaving them free to choose. Freedom is circumscribed by
imposing obligation where none was intended to exist.80 There are certainly
some parallels to the question of whether multiple fathers should be legally
recognized as opposed to being subject to the choice of other caretakers and/or
their own choices.
This is a weighty consideration given the power dynamics of post-divorce
families and the critique of joint custody as providing power without
responsibility, coupled with concerns about how this operates in scenarios
involving domestic violence. 81 On the other hand, the failure to recognize
caring adults who have performed as parents ultimately harms the child and
provides the adult with unlimited power that may be abused. From a children's
Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815 (2005); Margaret M.
Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 135 (2005); Mary Jane Mossman, Conversations about Families in
Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are There "Lessons "for the United States?, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2003); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The
Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435 (2001).
78 This is the Canadian model. On the Canadian model, see generally Nicholas
Bala & Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich, Context and Inclusivity in Canada's Evolving
Definition of the Family, 16 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 145 (2002), and Robin Cheryl
Miller & Jason Binimow, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex-
United States and Canadian Cases, 1 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2005).
79 Garrison, supra note 77, at 896-97..
80 Id.
81 Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 407 (2005) ; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY
& ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 267-70 (1992) (studying the tendency for custodial arrangements to
gravitate toward traditional preferences, i.e. post-divorce most mothers had primary
child care per the parties' own determination) ; Marygold S. Melli, The American Law
Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the Approximation Rule and Shared-
Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (2005) (arguing that the concept of joint
custody was initiated by fathers' rights groups and is opposed by some women's
groups who argue that the concept is a short-lived child care commitment in exchange
for reduced child support and tolerates domestic violence); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social
Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1969 n.190 (2000)
(noting that joint custody programs failed to change behavior because the programs
"were inconsistent with [parents'] private preferences" and noting the opposition of
women's groups to these programs who saw them as a "windfall for fathers" who were
not primary caretakers or played minimal roles prior to divorce).
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rights perspective it is indefensible. From a developmental perspective,
grounded in the value of continuity in the child's relationships, it is
indefensible. 3 Thus, the question might more fairly be put, in order to preserve
the relationships, is it necessary that de facto parents be made de jure parents,
or would some other status be preferable? 84 The answer may lie in how we
imagine multiple parents.
B. Models of Multiple-Parenthood
One way to imagine multiple-parenthood is to envision multiple social
parents coparenting simultaneously. My definition of fatherhood, and by
extension parenthood, revolves around nurture. I have defended a definition of
nurture that is both qualitative and quantitative. I have argued that fatherhood
should be thought of as a much fuller role, that minimalistic or secondary
caretaking is not sufficient; nurture, if shared, should be fifty-fifty, or at least
sixty-forty. If that definition is carried through in this context, then only
coequal nurturers, or close to that, can qualify as "parents." Otherwise, the
82 See Woodhouse, Refraining the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An
Environmental Paradigm, supra note 8, at 146.
83 See also the relevant literature on child development in the context of divorce
and parenting plans, such as Michael E. Lamb & Joan B. Kelly, Using the Empirical
Literature to Guide the Development of Parenting Plans for Young Children: A
Rejoinder to Solomon and Biringen, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 365, 366-69 (2001) (discussing
various theories of attatchment in the development of children); Judith Solomon &
Zeynep Biringen, Another Look at the Developmental Research: Commentary on Kelly
and Lamb's "Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody and
Access Decisions for Young Children ", 39 FAM. CT. REV. 355, 358-59 (2001) (arguing
that overnight separations from the primary caregiver should be avoided at least
through the 3rd year of life). See generally Dorothy G. Singer, Developmental
Variations Among Children and Adolescents-An Overview of the Research and
Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE AND VIOLENCE XXVII
(Dowd, et al., eds. 2006) (discussing developmental stages of children).
84 De facto parent is defined under the ALI principles, Section 2.03, as one who is
not a legal parent "who for a period of time that is significant, in light of the child's
age, developmental level, and other circumstances, has resided with the child, and for
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the consent of a legal
parent... regularly has performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child,
or a share of the caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom
the child primarily has lived." Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I, ALI, Mar. 20, 1998), § 2.03. For
an analysis of this section, see Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled
Promise of the New ALl Principles, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999), which
critiques the caretaker focus of the principles as disadvantaging many who act as
parents but do not perform the particular tasks that the principles focus upon. See id. at
774-82. For a critique of de facto parenthood, see Gregory A. Loken, The New
"Extended Family"-"De Facto" Parenthood and the Standing Under Chapter 2,
2001 BYUL. REV. 1045, 1048-63 (2001).
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strong concept of nurture that I have argued is essential would be diluted by a
looser definition of parent/father for the purpose of recognizing multiple
fathers. On the other hand, multiple fathers (and mothers) raise the question of
how one images "parents" beyond the conventional mother-father. If my model
of "equal coparenting" is applied, then it becomes important to consider how
parenting is envisioned: as a discrete set of tasks and relational pieces, a
limited "pie," or as a fluid relationship that allows for more engagement as
more adults are present. Additional adults might be beneficial or it might be
perceived as an infringement, but that all depends on how the role of parent,
and its relationship to other adults, is conceptualized. Thinking about multiple-
fatherhood convinces me that the most workable model is one where core or
primary parents coparent with secondary parents, who might vary considerably
in the amount of nurture that they provide as backup to the core parent(s).
A number of scholars have grappled with the question of multiple-
parenthood, beginning with the seminal article by Professor Katherine
Bartlett.85 Professor Bartlett argues for the importance and validity of the two-
parent norm within the marital family.86 Outside of the marital family,
however, Bartlett supports a multiple-parenthood model: when there is no
marriage or divorce, she argues family law should support the parenting of
stepparents, non-marital fathers, foster parents, and grandparents.87 She defines
the circumstances under which such a parent should be legally recognized as
(1) ideally, a relationship initiated by a neutral party acting on behalf of the
child, not an adult acting out of adult interests; (2) with the legal status of
parent based on the presence of psychological parenthood, defined as including
(a) a minimum of six months physical custody, (b) mutuality (meaning the
motive for care is caring for the child), (c) consent of the child's legal parent or
by court order, and (d) recognition of the adult as a legal parent ultimately is in
the best interests and welfare of the child.8
Other scholars have confirmed, modified, or disagreed with Professor
Bartlett's model. Professor Alison Young presents a model of a core caretaker
or couple, connected to other adults, which can include multiple fathers, as a
model for the legal concept of "family" when children are present. 89 The core
family unit, of one or more caretakers, has ultimate decision-making authority;
other adults with a special relationship with the child have rights of access and
visitation.90 Young's goal is to preserve the benefits of exclusivity while also
85 Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879 passim (1984).86Id. at 883.
87 Id. at 944-45.
88 Id. at 944-48.
89 Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm
of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 518 (1998).
90 Id. at 512.
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supporting the benefits of additional relationships. 91 She would not limit this to
a non-nuclear or non-marital family, 92 so in that sense she departs from and is a
critic of Bartlett. She cites as existing models of her concept the examples of
joint custody, stepparent adoption, and open adoption.93
Professor Matthew Kavanagh, drawing upon Young's work, centers his
notions of family around care, not exclusivity. 94 His model is care-based and
child-centered-both appealing principles. He cites very compelling statistics
to support his argument that care should govern, not structure or roles: less
than 50% of children will spend their entire childhood in a two-parent married-
couple biological family.95 He rejects, however, Young's notion of a core
family; rather, he would organize his definition around care, attention to
connections, and children's needs.96
Mutual caregiving relationships, in which an adult provides for the needs of
a child, should be legally recognized. The level of legal protection accorded
should be appropriate for, reflective of, and limited to that which is
beneficial and necessary to protect and support the established caregiving
relationship. Further, the legal protection accorded should be granted in
accordance with the protection for practical parental decision-making
authority necessary for the life of each child.9 7 . . . To deserve a physical
custody and decision-making power, adults would have to show a
relationship consistent with such a role. "Primary caregivers" or legal
"parents" would be those who live with and provide for the needs of a child
on a daily basis and whom the child recognizes as her full-fledged parent.
All of these, but only these, people would be invested with full decision-
making power in children's lives.98
Under Kavanagh's model, other caregivers would not have full rights, but
would have access rights based on their actual relationship. 99 Access could not
be terminated unless access was harmful to the child. 00
9' Id. at 508-09.
92Id. at 517.
9' Id. at 533-40.
94 Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 85-86 (2004)
95 Id. at 114.96 Id. at 117.
97 Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted).
98 Id. at 128-29; see also Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning
Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
329, 333, 364 (1995) (suggesting a primary/secondary model in the context of
collaborative reproduction by the use of a written contract); June Carbone, supra note
1, at 1334 (criticizing the way the legal system defines a parent because that definition
is often not "constitutive of the child's identity" and leads either to the involvement of
people who want no part in the child's identity or to the exclusion of people who want
to be involved with the child identity).
99 Kavanagh, supra note 94, at 130.
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Professor Joyce McConnell suggests the use of guardianship law as a
mechanism for including additional parents, and identifies concurrent
guardianship as a benefit to single parents so that a single parent who cannot
rely on another parent (e.g., an uninvolved legal parent) could still benefit from
the support provided by another adult. 0 1 McConnell's model focuses on the
custodial parent and her needs, and this focus gives significant control to that
parent while protecting the noncustodial parent's rights. 0 2 The use of the
guardianship mechanism also does not permit significant instruction by the
courts. 0 3
The models presented by these scholars suggest three choices. First,
Bartlett's model would accept multiple parents when, as she puts it, the nuclear
family has failed, when "nuclear" is defined as the marital family. 0 4 Her
model defines protected parents in terms of definitions of psychological parent,
a minimum time frame, and an overall best interests standard.'0 5 Second,
Young's model suggests a core parent or parents, coupled with a secondary
ring of parents.' 0 6 McConnell and King similarly suggest such a model with
respect to single parents who are primary or sole parents and to intended
parents and other parents in the reproductive technologies setting. 1 7 Finally,
Kavanagh suggests a more fluid, functional approach that focuses on actual
care relationships rather than a presumed core-parent or -parents model. 0 8
While Kavanagh's flexible approach is attractive (based on current
fathering patterns) some form of Young's model, recognizing a core primary
parent or partnership, makes the most sense. Sustained nurture throughout the
child's lifetime is what is most beneficial to the child. A core-parent model
supports and encourages such a relationship of social fathering irrespective of
marital status but in collaboration with another primary parent. Thus, those
fathers who maintain their commitment even when not married or no longer
married to the mother would be supported under this model. Once established,
one should expect core parents to continue to parent and support their efforts to
do so. That is the most compelling reason to support such a model and honor
their ability to parent and make decisions on behalf of their children.
'
00 Id. at 131.
101 Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families:
Building on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 30 (1998).
102 Id. at 60-61.
103 Id. at 66. June Carbone has suggested that we should separate identity from
care obligations, and that these two functions could be performed by two different
people, rather than the same person. She argues parentage should be about identity.
Carbone, supra note 1, at 1334.
104 Bartlett, supra note 85, at 882.
105 Id. at 946-48.
106 Young, supra note 89, at 518, 554.
107 McConnell, supra note 101, at 30; King, supra note 98, at 333.
108 Kavanagh, supra note 94, at 117,.
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A second reason to support Young's model is to clearly delineate the
difference between full fatherhood and partial fatherhood. Many fathers are not
fully engaged in the lives of their children, while others are fully engaged but
unrecognized. A core-parent model permits the nurturing father who is not a
coparent to remain recognized, and his relationship protected but not given the
rights of the core parent, when disagreements arise. Another pattern of our
current context is a series of social fathers: for example, a marital father, then a
stepfather; or a non-marital father, then a marital father, then a stepfather; or a
series of boyfriends who may have no biological or marital link. Each of the
social fathers, if they are true fully engaged fathers, might be a core or
secondary parent, but this model permits recognition of these fathers, most
likely as secondary parents to the mother as the primary parent. Finally, the
purely biological father or the disengaged father is not a rights holder, although
he may have responsibilities. This model of multiple-parenting should support
sustained relationships while at the same time demanding the nurture that
matters to the child and any other core parent. Fathers who disengage from
their children would lose their status as a core parent.
Coequal parenting is not the norm, nor is collaborative parenting, either
outside of marriage or inside it. 109 These inequalities should not be ignored.
My definition of nurture does this by its quantitative, as well as qualitative,
components. In addition, a model for multiple parents must face the necessity
of decision making when the parents disagree, or even the allocation of
decision making so that not every minute decision of parenting is subject to
discussion and input by multiple parents. Everyday, small decisions should be
left to the primary parent(s); big decisions (education, religion, activities,
handling disabilities, etc.) also ultimately must be for the core parent(s) to
make, hopefully in consultation with other coparents. 110 The role of primary
parent(s) should be a combination of fiduciary responsibility and decision-
making authority.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL
At least three issues might be considered about this multiple-parenthood
model. First, how would financial responsibility be allocated? Second, would
multiple-parenthood adversely affect promoting nurturing fatherhood? Finally,
109 DOWD, supra note 4, at 81-86. "[F]athers, in general, do far less parenting
work than mothers, and most men view their parenting involvement as discretionary.
Highly involved fathers are an anomaly." ARENDELL, supra note 47, at 2. Although
total work hours of mothers and fathers is roughly equal, "women still do twice as
much housework and child care as men." Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents
Spending More Time With Children, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.17, 2006, at A12.
'10 This is similar to the single custodial-parent model advocated by Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, in BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD . Id. at 37-39 (The Free Press 1979).
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what do other examples of multiple-parenthood teach us about this proposal? I
address each of these issues briefly in this section.
A. Financial Responsibilities
One issue with respect to multiple-parenthood is the distribution of
financial responsibility. The rights and responsibilities of parenthood need not
be inexorably connected. To the contrary, rights and responsibilities can be
separated. This is particularly the case with respect to financial support of
children.
One model of financial responsibility would consist of equal shares,
dividing responsibility between all who we would recognize as parents.
Alternatively, those identified as the core parents would have the sole financial
responsibility for children, as a defining characteristic of core parenthood, or as
a complementary obligation to their acts of nurture (or even as part of the
definition of nurture). Yet a third model would apportion responsibility
between core and secondary parents, with the greater burden on the core
parents. Another model would rest financial responsibility on genetic ties,
modified perhaps by intent in the case of reproductive technologies or trumped
by adoption. Finally, financial responsibility might rest on household
arrangements: those who live with children would be responsible, to some
degree, for their financial sustenance, much like the current model for
stepparents. Whether only marital fathers would be responsible under this
model, or all cohabitants, or only those who sustain a social father relationship,
is also an open question. Another factor to be considered in this equation is the
allocation of responsibility for children when new families are formed or
dissolved-should the responsibility for children be a constant, or should the
presence of new children change the equation? If the relationship changes,
from a marital father with some social involvement to a divorced father whose
relationship with children attenuates, should financial responsibility change?"'
The patterns of current support link to the relationship with the mother:
when that relationship is good, and especially when a household is shared,
economic support is more likely to be provided." 2 When relationship is
". On fathers and child support generally, see David.L. Chambers, Fathers, the
Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2575 (1995).
112 Custodial parents who had been married were substantially more likely to
receive full child support payments than those who had never married. See
CHILDTRENDS DATABANK, CHILD SUPPORT RECEIPT, available at
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/indicators/84childsupport.cfm. Frequency of visits
with the child and involvement in decisions related to the child also play a role in the
payment of support. Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships between Father and Children
Who Live Apart: The Father's Role after Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 88-
89(1991).
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maintained with the child, support is also more likely to be paid.' 3 If social
fathers are supported in their relationships with children, we might hope that
children will benefit economically from that sustained relationship.
The bigger question with respect to support is facing the dire economic
circumstances of the appalling number of children in poverty,' 14 and the
limited resources available from any definition of father-biological, marital,
social, core or secondary. Multiple-fatherhood ought not be supported as a
means to resolve this crisis of child poverty, as it in no way addresses root
causes including class and race. Social fatherhood should be supported because
it fosters children's non-economic nurture needs.
On the other hand, social fatherhood, singly or multiply, ought not to
remove responsibility for children. As I have advocated elsewhere, economic
responsibility ought to follow genetic connection unless another responsible
party has taken on that core responsibility.' 15 That responsibility should remain
until adulthood, irrespective of social connection, but it should not entitle an
adult to access or relationship if the adult has failed to create a relationship.
B. Is Exclusiviy Essential to Nurture?
A second issue is whether the adoption of multiple-parenthood would
undermine efforts to support and strengthen fatherhood as a nurturing ideal.
The temptation is to consider exclusivity as essential or important to nurture. I
suspect that temptation comes from underlying assumptions about masculinity
that imagine shared fatherhood as the antithesis of the masculine ideal of
traditional fatherhood.' 16 Certainly within the genetic definition of fatherhood
113 Seltzer, supra note 112, at 88-89.
114 In 2005, 39% (or 28.4 million) of US children lived in low-income families
(0-200% of Federal Poverty Level), 18% lived in families below the Federal Poverty
Level. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, BASIC FACTS ABOUT Low-
INCOME CHILDREN: BIRTH TO AGE 18, available at http://www.nc-
cp.org/media/lic06b-text.pdf. Fifty-one percent of the children living in low-income
families lived with single parents. Id. Sixty-one percent of black and Latino children
lived in low-income families compared to 26% of white children. Id.
115 Dowd, supra note 32, at 937.
116 The common law image of fatherhood was children as property and marriage
as protection of one's family unit from claims of parenthood by biological or social
fathers. The biological view of fatherhood reinforces a sense of a tangible link that
establishes a "claim" for fatherhood that reinforces the claim of exclusivity to one's
spouse as a "right" in the common law tradition of marriage and parenthood. While
much of the common law norms have been challenged in view of the adoption of
gender-neutral, egalitarian norms, the sustaining of a single place for fathers reinforces
a view of men as rivals instead of partners when the social context presents the
scenario of shared parenting.
For an extended discussion of dual paternity, and a reflection of the concerns of
potential conflict and disruption from shared fatherhood, see Valerie Seal Meiners,
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is the powerful assumption that it makes a difference if a man can identify a
child as "mine." A sense of possession, ownership or control is what drives
resistance to men collaborating as multiple fathers.'17
The greatest impediment to fathers, however, is not the challenge of other
men nurturing their children, but rather the difficulty of being nurturers due to
the combination of lack of socialization or affirmative education and modeling,
as well as the barriers to parenting because of an employment structure that
remains hostile to parenting, particularly for men."18 Masculinity is a
convenient excuse when structural and social barriers are most prominent in
limiting the opportunity for men to nurture their children, or at the very least,
making nurture exceptional rather than ordinary. 19
If multiple-parenthood was defined in a way that diminished the
expectation of nurture that I have insisted on as the definition of fatherhood,
then indeed it would be harmful to a nurturing ideal for fatherhood. But if the
support of multiple-fatherhood strengthened the recognition of men's nurture
and encouraged their engagement in collaborative parenting, then giving
formal recognition to informal patterns that already exist can only be
beneficial, not hurtful.
C. Lessons from Other Family Law Structures and Rules
The construction of multiple parenting as a legal status can benefit from
existing models of multiple parenting in family law. These include joint
custody (both joint legal and joint physical); open adoption; and third-party
visitation (grandparent statutes or more wide open statutes). In addition, we
might look at the changes in the legal treatment of what are loosely called
"non-traditional" or "alternative" families, including cohabitants, non-marital
fathers, and same-sex couples. What is useful to consider about each of these
other structures, policies or frameworks is the reasons why they came into
being, their purpose, and how they function on the ground, to see what lessons
they might have for constructing legal recognition of multiple parents, and
Comment, The Child with Two Fathers: Updating the Wisdom of Solomon, 46 LA. L.
REV. 1211 (1986).
117 The extreme instances of harm due to this reinforcement of rights and
exclusivity is evident in litigation over naming, see e.g., Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J.
120 (1995), where denial of the right to name the child, id., influenced the father to
murder the child and then commit suicide. See Clifford J. Levy, Father Kills His Son,
3, Then Himself, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at B5; as well as the killing of children in
domestic violence cases, see, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,
754 (2005).
"' DOWD, supra note 4, at 48-57, 182-202. The major focus of family law has
been upon supporting economic fatherhood, not nurture.
"19 On the work/family structural barriers for fathers, see id. at 48-57; Selmi,
supra note 54, at 759; Malin, supra note 54, at 1089.
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more particularly, multiple fathers. There is much to explore, and what I
suggest here is very preliminary.
Joint custody has been a subject of great controversy, and custody
structures in general remain one of the most difficult and contested areas of
family law. 1 ° The goal of custody post divorce has been the best interests of
children, and those interests have most recently been defined as perpetuating
the relationship with both parents. 121 The concept of the post-divorce family,
that is, a family that remains linked by ties to children even if the adult tie of
marriage no longer exists, is fairly recent. Single parents and "broken" families
continue to be pejorative, negative labels placed on families who experience
divorce. For many families, it is a struggle to sustain the post-divorce family in
a positive way. Nevertheless, when the post-divorce family is successful, that
is, when the parent-child relationships are sustained and consistent, we know
that children benefit. The value of joint custody, then, might be to demonstrate
how successful relationships benefit children, and what factors contribute to
success when the parents no longer share a household. At the same time, the
pitfalls of joint custody should be avoided, particularly where genetic and
marital links generate status that is not matched by social parenting.
Joint custody also functions within a relatively high remarriage rate, and
thus the presence of stepparents in the household. 122 Thus, it provides an
insight into successful multiple parenting. The uncertain status and obligations
of stepparents, in addition, provide an insight into concrete needs that multiple
parents have.1 23 Stepparents may function as core or primary parents, or they
120 See supra note 81 (joint custody literature). On the retreat of some states from
joint custody as a norm, see Dwyer, supra note 72, at 911.
121 See generally ALI Principles § 2.08 (2002) (discussing statutory and case law
treatment of joint custody).
122 In 2001, 15% of children lived in blended families, with half of those children
living with a stepparent. KREIDER & FIELDS, supra note 1, at 2.
123 See Dwyer, supra note 72, at 905 (arguing that, barring legal adoption of a
child by a stepparent, a stepparent's right to a relationship with a child is generally
subject to a continuing marital relationship with the child's biological parent);
Gregory, supra note 3, at 360-61 (noting that divorce and death of the biological
coparent are two common situations in which stepparent relationships are placed in
jeopardy); Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by
Estoppel and De Facto Parents under the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 285, 293-97 (2001)
(explaining the basis for upholding stepparental rights as de facto parents even where a
finding of in loco parentis cannot be supported); Alison Harvison Young, This Child
does Have 2 (Or More) Fathers... Step-parents and Support Obligations, 45 McGILL
L.J. 107, 111-14 (2000) (contrasting the recent expansion of Canadian law, which
recognizes that a stepparent's status cannot be unilaterally terminated by the other
parent, with American which treats stepparents as strangers); Jennifer Klein Mangnall,
Comment, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 399 (1997)
(noting that, absent a legal adoption, a stepparent lacks the rights and responsibilities
accorded a biological parent). Professor Ramsey cites statistics that indicate that 25%
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may be secondary parents. Function, then, is critical, and considering the needs
of stepparents as well as the way in which they function would be extremely
helpful in constructing legal norms.
Open adoption suggests as many useful insights as joint custody. 24 As
with joint custody, there is a range of actual ways in which open adoption
functions. For purposes of thinking about its insights, I will define it as an
adoption in which birthparents and adoptive parents are known to each other,
and where some relationship exists post adoption between birthparents and
children, ranging from minimal contact to secondary parenting, or where
parental relationships are established after the child or children reach
adulthood. The open-adoption model suggests primary or core parents as the
adoptive parents, and birthparents as genetic parents who may have some
relationship role to the children, although often falling short of a parental
relationship. In some respects, the open-adoption model suggests that the
secondary role of birthparents is more like the role of aunts and uncles, or
grandparents, in the traditional family structure. Because of the power of the
genetic connection, birthparents have a critical and unique place in the lives of
adopted children. 25 At the same time, adoptive parents and children need to
feel secure in their relationship, and because adoption severs the legal parent-
child relationship, birthparents do not act as coparents. Rather, the model has
evolved to challenge the historic secrecy attached to adoption and recognize
the importance of the links to family, ethnic and community history through
biological links. 126 To the extent social relationships flourish, they are positive
for children. 27 But the model is one that is quite fluid, driven by the ebb and
flow of adoption practice in the shadow of, and in spite of, the law. 28 Open-
of children will be part of a stepfamily by marriage; if cohabitation is included, the
percentage would be considerably greater. Ramsey, supra, at 287. As she also notes,
stepfamilies come in a variety of forms, including fifteen variations set out by one
researcher. Id.
124 On open adoption generally, see American Adoptions, Open adoptions,
http://www.americanadoptions.com/adopt/open-adoption (last visited March 23,
2007); Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 163, 187-88
(2002) (discussing open adoption's potential to allow multiple parties to share the
raising of a child to varying degrees and in keeping with the best interests of that
child); Amy L. Doherty, Foster Care and Adoption: A Look at Open Adoption, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 591, 593-93 (2000) (explaining possibilities for structuring
an open adoption, allowing for various levels of contact for birth parent involvement
where adoptive parents maintain the role of primary parents to a child).
125 Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The
Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 173 (1999).
126 Id. "All of us need to know our past, not only for a sense of lineage and
heritage, but for a fundamental and crucial sense of our very selves: our identity is
incomplete and our sense of self retarded without a real personal historical
connection." In Application of Maples, 563 S.W. 2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978).
127 Cahn & Singer, supra note 125, at 182.
1 81 Id. at 182-83.
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adoption agreements are not reliably enforced, 129 so the other piece of the
open-adoption model is the lack of legal support, and therefore informal
arrangements work only so long as parties do not claim legal backing. Open
adoption might also provide a model for the question of the possible
relationship between genetic and other parents, when the genetic parent is not a
social parent. It might suggest, in fact, that a relationship can be present and
supported on the model of third-party visitation, not of recognition of full-
fledged parental status.
Yet another model for multiple parenting is foster parenting, particularly
in light of the tendency toward long-term foster care, although foster parents
retain few if any rights if children are permanently placed or returned to their
birth families. 3 ° In the foster care structure, biological parents and potential
adoptive parents may be additional parents in the picture along with the foster
parents. As with adoption at or near birth, the primary or core parent changes.
The birthparents may be treated like birthparents in traditional adoption or they
may be denied contact or responsibility due to abuse or neglect. The foster and
adoptive parents, however, may remain as ongoing multiple parents, or the
foster parents may not choose to pursue an ongoing relationship with children.
Foster parenting provides an insight, however, into how children function with
129 Twenty-two states prohibit open adoptions. See Amy L. Doherty, Part Nine:
Foster Care and Adoption: A Look at Open Adoption, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
591, 594 (2000). Eight states allow private open-adoption agreements, but will not
enforce the provisions through court action. Id. Eight states enforce agreements
reflected in the adoption decree. Id. Twelve states have no clear open adoption policy.
Id.
130 Gregory, supra note 3, at 368-69. On foster parenting generally, and
particularly including the challenges of long-term foster care and aging out of the
system (suggesting that the current regime is not one to follow and faces similar needs
for rethinking exclusive parenthood), see: Susan L. Brooke, The Case for Adoption
Alternatives, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 43, 46-47 (2001) (discussing the current child welfare
system's focus on adoption, to the exclusion of options allowing other interested
parties, including kin and foster parents, to parent or otherwise play a role in a child's
upbringing); Alice Bussiere, Adoption and Foster Care. Permanence for Older Foster
Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 231, 233 (2006) (noting that child welfare policy is
sometimes responsible for severing the most beneficial ties for children, including
those with former foster parents); Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive
Parenting and the Right to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third
Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFFALO L. REV. 835 passim (2000) (discussing
extensively how a multiple-parent model can assist older children in the foster care
system with the transition to adult life as they prepare to "age out" of the system);
Stephanie Moes, Being Seen and Heard: Webster v. Ryan's Constitutional Protection
for Children's Right to Maintain Contact with Foster Parents, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 331,
passim (2002) (exploring the recognition in one family law court of a child's
constitutional right to remain in the care of a parent-like figure, such as a foster parent,
to whom he is already attached).
[Vol. 9
MULTIPLE PARENTS/MULTIPLE FATHERS
multiple and/or serial parents, and what structures serve them best to ensure
their resilience and development.
All of these frameworks thus far suggest the value of the concept of
visitation over the designation of parent.' A functional framework for
visitation includes not only those recognized as legal parents but also those
other parties who have a parental or parental type link to children, whose
relationship should be sustained in the child's best interests. Multiple parenting
as a concept may therefore also need to comprehend a status for those
individuals who are neither primary/core parents nor secondary parents, but
who nevertheless have a social relationship that merits support from the family
law system. Grandparents, aunts and uncles, and/or cohabitants may all assist
parents and maintain unique and valued relationships with children. They may
not, however, qualify under doctrines of psychological or de facto parent,
although their role and relationship is profound and significant. This suggests a
status outside of "parent" that would be given legal support, although still
subject to the stronger claims of core/primary parents and secondary parents.
Two other areas of change and flux in family law suggest the importance
and ability to take a functional approach to multiple parenting: cohabitation
and non-marital fatherhood. 32 The treatment of cohabitants, especially those
who have had children together, is moving toward treating them as
functionally married. 133 The treatment of non-marital fathers has moved toward
treating them as functionally equal to divorced fathers.' 34 The functional
approach has been grounded for cohabitants in the increasing degree of non-
marital coupling and childbearing, and a sense that the parties have
detrimentally relied, even if mistakenly, on the notion that they will divide
things fairly and provide some level of support to each other based on mutual
dependency. 135 The treatment of non-marital fathers reflects a change in men's
views of themselves as fathers outside of marriage even when they have never
been married, as well as links to gender equality norms.
36
One final area of comparison for multiple-parenthood may be the
evolution of doctrines within family law for same-sex couples, the political
131 See supra note 3.
132 See supra notes 63-64 and 77-78.
133 Garrison, supra note 77, at 818.
'34 DoWD, supra note 4, at 118.
13' Garrison, supra note 77, at 835-36.
136 DoWD, supra note 4, at 115-21; see also Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or
Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 991,
1004-07 (2006) (discussing non-financial contributions of non-marital African-
American fathers for children); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125, 127-28 (2006); Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological
Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's Co-
Parenting of her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 122-26 (2006) (discussing biological
father's right to block adoption).
2007)
JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES
controversy over same-sex marriage and gay adoption, and controversies over
custody and parental rights when one parent is gay and the other is straight.
37
Functional families and functional parents have been denied legal protection
because of sexual orientation under traditional family law, but those families
have creatively used available doctrines to protect relational ties. 138 Function
has defied not only a lack of legal status but also outright hostility and
stigmatization. It is important to note, however, that the effort generally has
been to establish the rights of two parents, not of multiple parents as I have
defined it here. At the same time, the same-sex example can be read as
identifying a key assumption of multiple-parenthood, and even of this essay:
the idea that there are identifiable parental roles. As I have pointed out
previously, since I identify the core/primary parent as either one or more
parents, I do not envision core parenthood as limited to, nor as necessitating,
two parents.
One can read the record of development of doctrines to protect same-sex
couples and children as suggesting that creating new categories is the wrong
way to go: there are existing doctrines and categories that could better be
used. 139 The creative use of what is already there allows greater personal,
private control rather than detailing a new scheme. All the variations of
137 On same-sex parenting issues generally, see David L. Chambers & Nancy D.
Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 523, 537-42 (1999) (discussing the treatment of gay adoption); Developments in
the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1629-59 (1989)
(discussing custody and visitation, adoption and foster care, and procreating and
parenting); Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian
Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 442-47 (2005) (discussing the application of
intent-based parenting to non-legal lesbian coparents); Heather Farm Latham,
Desperately Clinging to the Cleavers: What Family Law Courts Are Dong About
Homosexual Parents, and What Some are Refusing to See, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
223, 227-33 (2005) (discussing society's fears about gay and lesbian parenting);
Kimberly D. Richman, (When) Are Rights Wrong? Rights Discourses and
Indeterminacy in Gay and Lesbian Parents' Custody Cases, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
137, 152-57 (2005) (reviewing case law of the parental rights of gays and lesbians); D.
Ronner, Gay and Lesbian Adoption: Banishing the Pied Piperamy, 18 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 207, 208-11 (2005) (advocating the need for gay and lesbian adoption).
138 Adoption, most notably, has been used to create legal parent-child
relationships between non-biological same-sex partners and the children of their
partners, and adult adoption of a same-sex partner has been used as a tool to create a
legally recognized relationship for inheritance purposes.
139 For example, civil unions create a category that mirrors marriage but call it by
another name. For example, it gives the illusion of equality but in fact the categories
are not equal. Civil unions are not recognized in all states and do not confer any federal
benefits connected to marriage.
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recognition for same-sex partnerships is a perfect example of the downside of
creating new statutory structures.
140
On the other hand, the persistent denigration of familial and relational ties
of same-sex couples and families would suggest that establishing clear support
and status is essential for functional parents. At the same time, some controls
must exist in the structure for preventing the state from imposing or favoring a
new, or revised, version of the ideal family. Any doctrine can be put to
perverse use, and therefore the fear that multiple-parenthood might be used to
insert or support additional parents to ensure a heterosexual norm or balance is
a very real concern.
D. Research Agenda: Multidisciplinary Approaches
A final issue raised by multiple fathers or multiple parents is the
sufficiency of our knowledge about multiple parenting as a base upon which to
construct sound public policy and legal standards. It is possible, for example,
that the core/secondary model that I have advocated here is not the best model.
The patterns we have may not so much reflect a natural distribution of
parenting roles that benefit children as a pattern linked to social assumptions
that may or may not benefit children. Collecting available empirical data as
well as encouraging the collection of further data would be enormously
helpful, particularly from the disciplines of child development, sociology, and
psychology. What is needed is an evaluation of data that demonstrates the most
successful multiple-parenting relationships, and whether legal structures could
facilitate positive relationships for children, as opposed to getting in the way. I
suspect that developmental research would show that children's relationships
to adults depend on how well the adult functions, not the structure or number
of adults. Data on function and what facilitates positive relationships is crucial.
I do not think we can put the genie back in the bottle. Multiple parenting is
likely here to stay. The question is whether to facilitate it or not, and what
models are most positive for children.
140 Same-sex partners may be recognized under doctrines recognizing domestic
partnerships or civil unions, or may simply register as domestic partners, but only in
some states. In addition, some local jurisdictions recognize domestic partners, and
some employers extend benefits to domestic partners. Domestic partnership, however,
is a category without a uniform meaning, such that domestic partners do not have
identical benefits in various public and private settings. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, FAMILY: SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FAQs, http://www.ncsc-
online.org/wc/CourTopics/FAQs.asp?topic=SamSex (last visited March 20, 2007)
(offering data on civil union, domestic partnerships and differences between various
state definitions). For updated legislative and litigation in this area, see LAMBDA
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/issues/marriage-
relationships-family/ (last visited April 6, 2007);,ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/Igbt/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (discussing issues
affecting gays, lesbians, and society at large).
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Paradigms in family law have often shifted without data, to our
detriment. 14 1 The elimination of fault from divorce is one example; the
embrace of coequal, gender-neutral parenting based on genetic ties alone is
another. On the other hand, there are examples where data and practice have
reoriented rules that were based on moral assumptions rather than the well
being of children. Adoption is an example of this shift, where data on the
psychological issues and unique developmental challenges of children, and the
functioning of open adoptions, has changed the functioning of adoption from a
model of secrecy, silence, and myth to a model of acknowledged connection
and evolving appreciation of the role of birthparents in the lives of adopted
children.
We have changed our view of what works best as a result of data on the
harm of the secrecy model and the importance of knowledge, and sometimes
connection, with birthparents. Our assumptions about mothers and fathers have
not been bome out by the social science data either, causing important shifts in
our treatment of fathers (from unstudied and inessential to significant and
capable, albeit not unique or essential). We pursue research that demonstrates
that mothers working (only mothers, never fathers) harms children, 142 while the
data shows children doing well in high quality childcare and benefiting from
their mothers' work,143 although also indicating that the lack of structural
support for parents (not their failure to stay home) harms children. 144 We can
demonstrate well-supported parents are better workers, 145 although the
structure of work of most employers has yet to change to reflect that. 146
141 On the importance of good empirical data and the danger of overreaction to
minimal studies, see Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U.
ILLINOIS L. REV. 1083 passim (2002).
142 See Kei M. Nomaguchi, Maternal Employment, Nonparental Care, Mother-
Child Interactions, and Child Outcomes During Preschool Years, 68 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1341, 1361-63 (2006).
143 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.S.
DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: FINDING FOR CHILDREN UP TO AGE 4
YEARS, 1-2 (2006) available at http://www.nichd.nih.gov/publications/pubs/up-
load/seccyd_051206.pdf.
144 See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 Ariz.
L. REV. 431, at 453-56, 489-93 (1991) (discussing the various kinds of stresses from
work/family conflict).
141 Much of the work/family literature makes the case for the bottom line business
advantage of supportive work-family policies. See Ellen Alyssa Friede & Ellen Ernst
Kossek, The Business Cases: Managerial Perspectives on Work and the Family, in
THE WORK AND FAMILY HANDBOOK (Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes, et al. eds. 2006) (a
comprehensive analysis of work/family issues including the impact on employee
productivity). A recent study focuses on the positive health effects of reducing stress
for employees linked to work/family supports. WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH AND WELL-
BEING (Suzanne Bianchi, et al, eds. 2005). For examples of successful American
employers recognized for their work/family policies, see the list of top employers at
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When it comes to parents, we have always assumed that two is best,
preferably one man and one woman. 47 We have stigmatized single parents
because of that assumption, discouraging single parenting.148 Yet well-
supported single parenting is as successful as dual parenting. 149 And dual
parenting is not an unqualified marker of success. The significance of two
opposite-sex parents has also been assumed, linked to assumptions of healthy
child development and learning gender roles.50 This ignores the actual data on
development of gender roles even as it assumes a unified gender role that is
implicitly heterosexual. It ignores what we know about sexual orientation in
favor of an assumption that heterosexuality can be taught, despite the reality
that most gays and lesbians grew up in heterosexual families,' and the
children of gays and lesbians do not follow the sexual orientation of their
parents. 1
52
Accepting multiple parents goes against the grain of these common and
deeply rooted assumptions. Data is important and essential on the core issue of
whether multiple parenting is good or bad, but even more important, on how
multiple parenting can be done well, for the greatest good to children.
V. CONCLUSION
In this exploration of multiple parenting in the context of multiple fathers,
I have raised more questions than given answers. Given these questions and the
model which I have embraced for multiple parenting, it is important to return
Working Mother, http://www.workingmother.com (follow "Best Companies"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
146 See LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: REDESIGNING WORK FOR
PRODUCTIVE AND SATISFYING LIVES (2006) (discussing the need to restructure the
workplace); Dowd, supra note 144, at 446-47 (discussing lack of structural support for
work and family); Ellen Ernst Kossek, Growing Tensions Between Employment Policy
and a Changing Workforce in A THIRTY YEAR PERSPECTIVE, IN AMERICA AT WORK:
CHOICES AND CHALLENGES (Edward Lawler & James O'Toole, eds. 2006) (discussing
the effects of employment policies that fail to support workers with families).
147 Bartlett, supra note 85, at 880-83.
148 DOWD, supra note 66, at 4.
14 9 1Id. at 108-12.
150 Id. at 27-38.
151 The estimates of the occurrence of homosexuality in the population are
approximately 10-15%; thus, most gay and lesbian children grow up in straight
households and a major issue in their sexuality is often coming out to their parents.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, GAY, LESBIAN AND
BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS,
http://www.aacap.org/page.ww?section=Facts+for+Families&name=Gay%2C+Lesbia
n+and+Bisexual+Adolescents (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
152 Mike Allen & Nancy Burrell, Comparing the Impact of Homosexual and
Heterosexual Parents on Children: Meta-Analysis of Existing Research, 32(2) J. OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 19, 30 (1996).
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to where I began, by evaluating how multiple parenting fits against Schneider's
articulation of the channelling function of family law, and my principles of
antisubordination and limited instrumentality.
The channelling function of family law is the means by which the law
"recruits, builds, shapes, sustains, and promotes social institutions."1 53 The
model that I have outlined for multiple parents fits into Schneider's example of
supporting a status (parenthood) by redefining that status around nurture and
care, and allowing for multiplicity. The social value involved is the wellbeing
of children and the value of care, together with the recognition that how care
functions is not defined by the number two. Schneider used parenting as one of
his examples of the law's channelling function. 54 Under multiple parenting,
one who is a parent is still rewarded and supported, but the status is based on
conduct rather than genetic or marital connection, and the presence of multiple
parents is not pushed away by a dual-parent model. A cautious approach would
be to utilize existing doctrine to support multiple parenting. A more radical
approach would be to embrace multiple parenting with an emphasis on
functional parenting defined around nurture that demands of parents all that
children deserve.
I have further argued that we should be cautious about law's relationship
to culture. Under the principle of antisubordination, the issue is whether the
adoption of a system of legal rules to support multiple fathers, or more
generally, multiple parents, would subordinate some families or children.
Arguably, the purpose of adopting rules that permit multiple parents is
designed to do exactly the opposite. The intention is to better support the actual
nurturing relationships between children and parents, and also to recognize the
variations in nurture that make all potential parents not equal. By defining
parenting as nurture, and concretely defining what nurture is, and by
recognizing the importance of a primary parent or parents, the model I have
proposed aims to support multiple relationships while demanding that the
parents engage significantly in social parenting in order to be legally supported
as a primary or secondary parent. In addition, since my definition of nurture
requires cooperative, collaborative relationships with other caregivers, it is
sensitive to efforts to use care as a tool to subordinate other caregivers.
Exercising power over another is not nurture.
Given the asymmetric parenting patterns of mothers and fathers, does this
subordinate either? That is, might the support of multiple parents undermine
the position of mothers even further, along the lines of the unintended
consequences of gender neutrality principles in family law coupled with
preferences for some form of joint custody. If the principle of nurture is
sufficiently robust, then neither mothers nor fathers should be subordinated.
Mothers, who currently perform more caregiving, might find themselves more
strongly supported as the sole primary parent if the father or fathers only
153 Schneider, supra note 6.
154 Id., at 500.
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perform in a secondary role. That would be a stronger position than under
current gender neutrality norms. Fathers who do nurture their children, on the
other hand, would be more strongly supported within the family law system
because their conduct would be more measurable and legally supported. For
both mothers and fathers, this model fosters collaborative approaches, and at
the same time would not foster unintended intervention because it requires
cooperation among caregivers as part of the definition of nurture.
Under the principle of limited instrumentality, the question is whether
supporting multiple-fatherhood would put the law ahead of cultural values.
This might seem to be an easy answer, because multiple-fatherhood is already
being practiced. One can argue that there is no problem in this respect; law is
simply reflecting an existing reality and supporting it more fully. On the other
hand, fatherhood is a contested and difficult subject. Concerns over the extent
of fatherlessness for children are significant; and fathers' rights groups argue
the system is biased against them. If multiple-parenthood is understood as
relieving men of their responsibilities then legal support for such a notion will
be resisted by the culture. If multiple-parenthood is seen as interventionist, the
state inserting and supporting additional parents in derogation of the traditional
marital nuclear family, this also might be resisted by the culture as contrary to
valued norms of family privacy. Multiple-parenthood is most in harmony with
cultural values when it captures the reality of valued care to children. In that
sense law is not ahead of culture but behind it, supporting what is already
socially valued care.
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